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Abstract: This paper examines the nature of regional trade integration between the United States 
and Canada by using a Similarity Index that summarizes the behavior of exports of states along 
the US/Canadian border relative to US states that are not on the Canadian border. An export 
Similarity Index is used to show the considerable importance of industry mix relative to distance. 
Similarity Index changes suggest that increased export sales between the US and Canada 
between 1996 and 2001 were not primarily driven by proximity factors that underlie a regional 
phenomenon. Industry factors independent of location and distance were important contributors 
to changes in US exports to Canada. The upshot is that global, not regional, factors may underlie 
increasing trade between the US and Canada. That is, an apparent global phenomenon may have 
been mistaken for a regional one.  
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Introduction  
  
Alan Rugman challenged conventional wisdom with data and analysis that shows that 
when the history books are closed on the last half of the 20
th century, the chapter heading 
will say “The Age of Regionalization” not “The Age of Globalization”. This distinction 
clearly matters for researchers and policymakers, whether they are practicing in business, 
government, or academe. My paper dives down deep into the muck of disaggregated sub-
national data to add evidence to this issue. I do not find compelling evidence of 
regionalization with respect to the United States and Canada for the 1996 to 2001 time 
period. My results are compatible with Wall (2003). 
1 
  
The next section is a review of Rugman’s work and his conclusion that favors 
regionalization over globalization. I then explain why disaggregated data – data for 50 
states and 97 industries – can be used to shed more light on this issue and how a Similarity 
Index can be used to add evidence to the regional/global question. Similarity Index changes 
are presented and compared for US exports to Canada and to the world. The Similarity 
Index values measure increasing similarity or dissimilarity of the industry mix of exports 
from two sets of states – the ones that border Canada and the ones that don’t. The final 
section contains my summary. While the overall Similarity Index numbers support the idea 
that distance or proximity matters for trade, a closer look at the details suggests there is 
some room for doubt. Thus, my analysis finds no compelling evidence for regionalization 
                                                 
1 Howard J. Wall (2003) examined the impacts of NAFTA on exports for the time period from 1993 to 
1997. He found that NAFTA did not uniformly increase trade within the pact’s members and explained 
why economies of scale and trade creation and diversion can and did lead to increased trade between pact 
and non-pact members. The trade experiences of various regions of Canada were quite distinctive. For 
example, whereas Western Canadian exports to Mexico rose by over 90%, those from Eastern Canada 
increased by less than 1%.    3
and suggests that existing and historical links among the industries of various countries was 
more important than distance in determining changes in trade between Canada and the US 
between 1996 and 2001.  
Distance, Regionalization, and Globalization 
Alan Rugman in a series of papers argues that international trade has not become more 
global – it has become more regional. Rugman and Verbeke (2003a) look at foreign sales 
as a percentage of total sales for the world’s 500 largest multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
and is able to classify only 10 of them as truly global. Examining 100 of the world’s largest 
(MNEs), Rugman and Verbeke (2003) conclude
2  “Therefore, in the overall set of 20 
highly internationalized MNEs, the case of global strategy and structure can be made for 
only six firms, with the additional observation that even these firms exhibit regional 
elements.” Rugman and Brain (2002) found additional evidence with respect to the 
regionalization/globalization issue. They found that while intra-regional trade within 
NAFTA countries increased significantly, foreign direct investment (FDI) flows did not. 
FDI was more apt to develop between the EU and NAFTA. The investment result, they 
explain, is the result of many decades of free trade in the automotive manufacturing sector 
in North America that precluded the need for cross border investments. They point out that 
desires for increased trade in services has resulted in larger Canadian investments in US 
services industries.  
  
Rugman is essentially saying that the emphasis on globalization has been misplaced, 
leading to misunderstanding. Business schools mislead students if they teach global 
                                                 
2 Rugman and Verbeke (2003), page 8.    4
strategy when business decisions largely are influenced by regional trends and changes. 
Policymakers mislead the public about the impacts of global policies if the more urgent 
needs for policy exist within multi-country triads. Policymakers create unrealistic hopes for 
global trade outcomes if the needs for such policies are exaggerated.  
  
Tracking trade shares and examining the behavior of the 100 or 500 largest companies by 
triad offers useful but insufficient evidence about the regionalization/globalization debate. 
Results depend very much on the definition of optimal distance. Rugman implicitly 
assumes that a triad is the right distance measure. But triads are very large both in terms of 
distance and culture (Uruguay and Quebec are in the same triad). My approach uses a much 
shorter measure of distance that derives from the location difference of the 15 states on the 
southern border of Canada relative to the other states.
3 
  
My paper focuses on the principal discriminating factor in the regional/global debate – 
distance or proximity. Regionalization makes sense because distance – whether measured 
by kilometers or culture – is a “barrier” to trade. It makes sense, therefore, that business 
find it easier and more profitable to engage in business closer to home. Doing global 
business – in all triads – would be a second best solution for many companies that seek the 
benefits of international trade. My work tests the importance of distance by putting it on 
equal footing with industry mix explanations of international trade. Underlying the idea of 
globalization are pre-existing industry linkages. While a company might want to trade 
closer to home, it might also want to take advantage of country, company, or industry 
                                                 
3 Alaska is not included with the 15 border states. It is not part of a contiguous region of border states and 
its economy is quite different from the others. Alaska largely exports oil, fishing, and other mineral 
products.    5
relationships that have formed over time. The question we pose is that for 1996 to 2001, for 
changes in US export sales to Canada, how important was the role of proximity relative to 
industry mix? If proximity is shown to be less important, then we consider this as 
weakening the case for regionalization.   
Similarity Index 
I use an industrial mix Similarity Index
4 to identify cases where industry differences played 
strong roles in state export performance from 1996 to 2001.
5 The range of this index is 
from zero, indicating complete dissimilarity, to 100, indicating the state’s sectoral 
distribution of exports is identical to the national distribution. 
  
I use industry export Similarity Indexes that compare export sales of the 15 border states to 
the remaining 35 non-border states. If, according to a Similarity Index, border state exports 
to a given foreign destination became less similar to non-border states exports over a given 
time period, that result would imply that industry mix was important to relative export 
performances of border states. If this turned out to be true for exports to Canada, then this 
would be evidence supporting the regionalization hypothesis. If this evidence of export 
industry dissimilarity turned out to be truer for Canada than for other export destinations, 
this would make the regionalization case even stronger. Because of distance and location, 
one would expect export industry dissimilarity between border and non-border states to be 
                                                 
4Coughlin and Pollard (2001), page 29.   
5We choose 1996 to 2001 for several reasons. First, the data we use with the rich industry detail is 
published with state detail only back to 1996. We wanted the data to be as long-term as possible, but no 
data exists for the pre-1996 time period, especially because of the timing of NAFTA. Second, data for full-
year 2002 were not available when the research was done for this paper. Third, because there was very 
rapid export growth that peaked in 1999/2000, ending earlier than 2001 would have yielded a sample 
period with little cyclical variability. Containing 2000 and 2001 allows for a time period with both very 
strong increases and decreases in export sales. While some might point out that our beginning and ending 
dates are not equivalent time periods insofar as export strength is concerned, there is nevertheless, an 
expected upward trend over the time period as witnessed by the positive growth rates over that time period.    6
much more important for Canada than for other export destinations. Of course, if pre-
existing industrial structure of export sales was more important than distance, then one 
might expect no change in industry-based similarity over time. To make this point more 
vivid, consider the following matrix:  
State/Destination Canada  Rest of World (R)  
  Industry 1          Industry 2 Industry 1       Industry 2 
Border         .7                        .3         .5                   .5 
Not Border         .6                        .4          .5                   .5 
 
Each cell contains export sales share data for each industry in a border or non-border state. 
For simplicity, in this example we assume only two industries comprise a state’s exports. 
Assume also that industry 1 in the border state specializes in Canada while industries 1 and 
2 are roughly equal with respect to exports to the rest of the world. Consider the cell for 
border state exports to Canada which says that 70% of the border state’s X1 exports go to 
Canada. The remaining 30% of border state’s exports to Canada are from Industry X2.  
 
Now consider three types of changes that might affect these export sales.  
1.  Regional shock when distance is very important  
2.  Regional shock when distance is not important 
3.  Global shocks 
 
Border states have a larger share of industry 1 exports going to Canada than do the non-
border states. If distance is very important, one would expect that a regional shock that 
promotes more integration would favor border state industry1 more than non-border state 
industry 1.
6  In that case the industry 1 border to non-border share gap should increase and 
                                                 
6 Lorraine Eden commented on an earlier draft of this paper that much of the impact of the Canadian-US 
Free Trade Agreement would have been felt before 1996. NAFTA would have been a more dominant shock 
between 1996 and 2001. Thus, one might not have expected significant increases in trade integration 
between Canada and the border states. In this version I compare Similarity Index changes with respect to 
Canada and Mexico and find the surprising additional result that the Mexico-bound exports of states along 
the Canadian border were more affected than states closer to Mexico. This underscores the point of the 
article, that distance is not the paramount factor in determining export flows. This paper is not meant to be 
an event-shock study. Much was happening – beyond NAFTA and the unfolding impacts of the Canadian-  7
the Similarity Index for Canada would decrease. But this would have no effect on the 
Similarity Index value for the rest of the world. If distance was not important, in contrast, 
there is no reason to expect the Similarity Index to decrease for either location.  
 
Global shocks could have two different kinds of impacts. Consider a global shock that 
favors border state industry 1’s exports to the world. For example, suppose that border state 
industry 1 has been negatively impacted by trade regulations that are now removed n 
countries where border states have heavily exported. This might decrease the Similarity 
Indexes for both Canada and/or the US. Thus, evidence that the Similarity Index for 
Canada decreased would not be sufficient evidence of regionalization. A second kind of 
global shock might negatively impact industry 2 in the border state. In that case a global 
shock would decrease the Similarity Index as global factors tended to disproportionately 
impact the minority share industry in the border versus the non-border states.  
 
The upshot of these examples is that rising dissimilarity of industrial export distributions of 
border to non-border states could result from: 
•  Regional factors that promote increased trade and distance matters 
•  Global industry or country factors that increase trade and favor high share industries 




Exports Sales and Export Shares of Border and Non-Border States, 1996 
to 2001 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
US Free Trade Agreement – in the 1996-2001 time period that might have impacted trade with the border 
and non-border state export destinations. This work simply compares the role of distance and industry mix 
over that time period.   8
US exports to the world were $622.8 billion in 1996 and subsequently increased to $731 
billion in 2001 after peaking at $780.4 billion in the year before.
7 Table 1 shows the 
situation of the border states in 1996. These 15 states sold $188 billion to the world, or 
about 30% of all US exports. These states, however, accounted for almost exactly 50% of 
US exports to Canada. In contrast the $7.6 billion sold to Mexico was only 13% of US 
exports to that destination in 1996.  
 
With respect to individual states, there was considerable diversity in sales by export 
destination.  New York was the largest exporter to the world from among the border states. 
Michigan, however, was the largest exporter to both Canada and Mexico. Michigan, 
Illinois, New York, and Ohio accounted for about two-thirds of the border state’s exports to 
Mexico and Canada. Washington, a major exporter to the world, in comparison, was a 
relatively small part of the border state’s exports to either Mexico or Canada. 
Table 1 here 
Table 2 shows export growth between 1996 and 2001 from the US, the 15 border states, 
and the remaining non-border states to the World, Canada, and Mexico. US exports to the 
world grew by 17% over that 6-year time period. Exports to Mexico and Canada grew 
faster, at 79% and 23%, respectively. Exports of border states to the world grew by 22.5%, 
faster than exports of the non-border states of 15.1%. The 15 states along the Canadian 
border, therefore, led the nation in international sales to the world. The same result holds 
true for exports to Mexico. The magnitude of the growth rate differences, however, are 
                                                 
7  The data used throughout this report is Harmonized System of Tariffs or Schedule B information 
supplied by the US Census Bureau and distributed by Global Trade Information Services, Inc. For more 
information about this and other similar state export sales data, see Davidson (2003). 
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much larger for exports to Mexico. States with especially strong growth rates to Mexico 
were Indiana, Washington, Ohio, and New York. With respect to Canada, however, the 
story changes. The non-border states exports to Canada grew by 35%, almost three times 
the increase of the 13% increase for the border states. Michigan and New York, two of the 
larger exporters to Canada in 1996, had very weak growth in export sales to Canada during 
that time period. These facts alone warrant a closer look at the regionalization phenomenon 
since, at surface, they seem to contradict the importance of distance.  
Table 2 here 
 
The growth rate experience is evident in the shares of exports. Table 3 shows the shares of 
world exports as they were in 1996 and the changes in shares between 1996 and 2001. We 
see that 35% of the exports of the states that border Canada went to Canada in 1996. 
Mexico was a minor destination, receiving only about 4% of exports from these northern 
states.  The non-border states were more apt to sell their exports to Asia (35%) or Europe 
(23%). These states were more likely than border states to sell to Mexico but less likely to 
sell to Canada than their northern counterparts.  
 
Some of these shares changed markedly between 1996 and 2001. The largest changes in 
shares for the border states were a 3% increase in share to Mexico and 3% decreases in 
shares to Canada and Japan. They also increased share by 2% to Europe. The non-border 
states, in contrast, had an increase share of goods going to Canada. The share going to 
Mexico rose by 6%.  
Table 3 here 
These results provide conflicting evidence for the regionalization hypothesis. First, US 
neighbor Mexico clearly has become more important to both groups of states. Its share   10
increases dominated all other world region share increases. For the non-border states, 
Mexico and Canada together saw a share increase of 9%, much larger than any of the other 
areas. But for the border states, export share to Canada fell by about the same amount as 
exports to Japan. The share of exports to Mexico rose, but not much faster than increases to 
the EU and to Australia/Oceana. For the country as a whole, therefore, the results are 
mixed and we look further at industry performances to examine these apparent 
contradictions.  In particular, a declining share of exports from border states to Canada is 
not sufficient reason to reject regionalization. The question revolves around the industrial 
composition of the decline – was it because key industries in the border states had a 
common experience with the same industries in non-border states (no increase in 
dissimilarity)? Or was it because border state industries with strong ties to Canada showed 
declines relative to the same industries in the non-border states (increase in dissimilarity)   
Thus, the Similarity Index will give us information that goes beyond the usual aggregated 
information about share changes. 
  
Similarity Index Values  
  Introduction 
 
A Similarity Index is used to measure the similarity of industry exports of the border to 
the non-border states for their exports to the world in 1996 and for changes between 1996 
and 2001. A Similarity Index sums the minimum share values for each industry, where 
the minimum refers to the lesser of the shares for the border and non-border states.
8 
                                                 
8 These sums are simple sums of minimum share values and are not weighted. This might give the 
impression that unimportant industries had as much influence on the totals as important industries (those 
with large shares). But the fact is that the sums and the changes in sums were dominated by the largest 
industries. This makes sense because the minimum share for most of the industries were very small 
numbers. Many were less than 1%. The share values and changes in share values for a few large industries   11
  Similarity Index Values by Export Destination  
Table 4 shows the Similarity Index values for the border states in 1996. The value for 
exports to the world in 1996 was 77.9, indicating that the industrial composition of border 
state and non-border states exports to the world were quite similar in that year.
9 
Somewhat higher values existed in 1996 for exports to EU15 and Canada, respectively 
79.2 and 79.1.The border states were least like the non-border states with respect to 
exports sales in 1996 to Other Europe and Mexico. The destinations roughly fell into 
three groups with respect to the Similarity Index: 
•  Highly similar: EU15, Canada, Other Western Hemisphere, Other Asia 
•  Somewhat similar: Australia, Japan, Africa, Southeast Asia 
•  Not very similar: Mexico, and Other Europe.  
 
Table 4 also shows that similarity declined between 1996 and 2001 for exports to the 
world and for exports to eight of the 10 regions. This means that for all destinations, 
except for EU15 and Japan, the structure of industry exports of the border states became 
less like the structure for the non-border states.
10  The border states were becoming more 
distinctive, less like the non-border states for all destinations besides EU15 and Japan. 
The Similarity Index decreases ranged from about -0.6% for Australia to -26.2% for 
                                                                                                                                                 
were quite large in comparison – several in double digits. Inasmuch, the more important industries 
dominated the results.  
9 The similarity values for the individual states ranged from 36 to 76, indicating that while some states were 
quite like the non-border states, some were not. Most similar to the non-border states were Illinois, New 
York, and Minnesota. Least like the non-border states were Vermont, Washington, North Dakota, and 
Montana 
10 This was primarily because of industry changes in Washington, Illinois, Ohio and Wisconsin. In contrast, 
the industrial structures of 11 border states became more like that of the non-border states, though to 
differing degrees. Having the largest changes toward similarity were Vermont, Massachusetts, Maine, 
Montana, and New York   12
Africa. The value for Canada fell by nearly 5% about twice the decline for exports to the 
world.
11 
Table 4 here 
 
The single fact that the Similarity Index fell twice as much for Canada than for the World 
is evidence in favor of regionalization and the importance of distance. If distance is very 
important, then one would expect that the states closest to Canada would develop closer 
and stronger trade relationships with Canada. But several other facts suggest that the 
Canada Similarity Index change was not very special and question the importance of 
distance:  
•  Three country destinations (Africa, Southeast Asia, and Other Asia) had very 
large negative Similarity Index changes indicating that the border states had 
significant share changes relative to the non-border states. 
•  Other Europe and Other Western Hemisphere had negative changes similar in size 
to Canada’s. 
•  The border states are considerably farther from Mexico than Canada, yet the 
change in Similarity Index was similar for exports to these two countries.  
  
Our examples of similarity change above suggest some answers to these questions. We 
listed three factors that might cause rising dissimilarity. Any of these would explain a 
decline in the Similarity Index (border states export share becoming more dissimilar with 
non-border states):  
•  Regional factors that promote increased trade and distance matters 
•  Global industry or country factors that increase trade and favor high share 
industries  
•  Global industry or country factors that decrease trade and penalize low share 
industries 
 
Trade did increase over the time period, but the share of the border states exports to 
Canada decreased. Therefore, it looks like global rather than regional factors might have 
                                                 
11 These conclusions about the degree of similarity or dissimilarity stem from intuitive judgments. I know 
of no standard statistical tests to determine statistically significant deviations.    13
been influential towards explaining the decline in the Similarity Index.  This requires a 
deeper look into the sources of changes in the Similarity Index.  
  Similarity Index Changes by Industry 
 
The similarity changes reflect changes in the industry shares of exports to the world of 
each state. We can see why various border state exports become more or less the same as 
the non-border states by examining the role of the 98 industry sectors that comprise each 
state’s export sales. It would seem straight-forward to examine the contribution to the 
Similarity Index for each industry by state. However, because of the construction of the 
index and the interplay of the many industries, the changes in the minimum share values 
do not always convey this information. Instead, I calculated for each industry in each 
state for its exports, the value which I will call  I-SIM
12, where  
 
    I-SIM= Absolute value of the border state share gap in 2001 minus  
       Absolute value of the border state share gap in 1996 
 
The border state share gap is defined as the difference between the industry share in the 
border states and the non-border states. I-SIM is always greater (less) than zero when the 
industry share’s are becoming more similar (dissimilar).  
 
The industries with the greatest I-SIM values for exports to the world and exports to 
Canada were: 27 (Mineral Fuel/Oil), 84 (Machinery), 85 (Electrical Machinery), 87 
Vehicles), and 88 (Aircraft/Spacecraft). These industries dominated the share changes 
between 1996 and 2001. Industries 84, 85, and 87 are the main export industries of the 
                                                 
12 I thank my colleague Mike Baye for helping me think through this issue and for suggesting I-SIM.     14
United States. These three industries in 1996 accounted for over 57% of the border state’s 
exports to the world and over 49% of non-border states exports. 
 
Whereas I-SIM values were used to choose these important industries, we discuss below 
the actual share changes by industry and export destination to interpret why they 
contributed to changes in similarity. Four cases are analyzed. 
First, the most intuitive case supporting regionalization is when the share gap for exports 
to Canada in 1996 was positive and then became more positive between 1996 and 2001. 
This result held for the following cases, suggesting that border states improved their 
position relative to non-border states with respect to exports to Canada: 
  84: the border state share rose more than the non-border state share 
  87: the border state share fell, but somewhat less than the non-border state share 
 
Second, this result is somewhat diminished by the fact that border states generally 
improved their share positions relative to non-border states with respect to exports to 
other locations in which the border states had no “distance” advantage: 
•  88: border state share to the world increased while share of non-border states fell 
•  84, 87: border state exports to Mexico increased much more than non-border state 
exports to Mexico 
 
Third, an intuitive case favoring regionalization exists when the share gap was negative 
in 1996 and then shrank (moved closer to zero from a negative value) between 1996 and 
2001. In this case the border states would be converging in share on the non-border states   15
from below. There were no cases of this happening with respect to Canada. But there 
were several cases of this for other destinations that go against this intuition since they 
imply that the states that border Canada were doing relatively better in Mexico and the 
EU than the non-border states: 
•  85, 88: border states exports shares rose more than non-border states export shares 
to Mexico 
•  27: border states export share fell but by less than non-border states export shares 
to the EU15 
 
Fourth, if the share gap in 1996 was positive and it declined between 1996 and 2001, this 
would indicate that the border state advantage to Canada was eroded by the more distant 
non-border states. This would be evidence against regionalization. This was true for 
industry 27, wherein border states export share fell to Canada while non-border states 
share was rising. This result was also true for other destinations where the share gap was 
eroded between 1996 and 2001: industry 84 (to the world), industry 85 (to the EU15), 
and industry 87 (to the world and the EU15).  
 
If the share gap in 1996 was negative and became more negative this would indicate that 
the border states were becoming even less competitive with respect to export shares over 
time. One would not expect this result for exports to Canada if regionalization were 
strong within an industry. But this was true for industry 85 which saw the border share 
falling to Canada significantly more than the non-border share. For industry 88, the 
border state share rose, but the non-border state share increased even more. In these   16
cases, the states became more dissimilar, but this was not evidence consistent with 
regionalization. This loss of relative share was not just true for exports to Canada. It was 
also true for industries 85 to the world and industry 27 to the world and to Mexico.  
 
Summary  
Did export sales to Canada of the border states differ from the non-border states?  If yes, 
then this implies that distance and proximity were important.  The Similarity Index 
decreases in value whenever the absolute value of the share gap between border and non-
border industries increased. Another way of saying this is that the shares of border and 
non-border industries diverged. If the close proximity of the border states to Canada was 
meaningful, then the special relationship between these states and Canada should have 
been enhanced and revealed.  
 
The Similarity Index value between 1996 and 2001 for Canada fell by 5%. This implies 
increasing divergence – thus the border states were becoming less like the non-border 
states with respect to Canada. The Similarity Index fell for 10 of the 15 border states 
indicating that the increasing divergence was shared by most of the border states. The 
strongest divergence was exhibited by Idaho, Maine, Illinois, and Wisconsin. This 
contrasted with Similarity Index changes for exports to the world wherein only four of 
the 15 border states showed increasing divergence. This implies that proximity to Canada 
was important for the time period from 1996 to 2001. Thus, regionalization seems to be 
at work in North America. But there is other evidence that questions this conclusion.  
   17
First, while border state exports were increasing over the 1996 to 2001 period, exports to 
Canada (13%) were growing slower than exports to the World (23%). As a result, the 
share of border state exports to Canada decreased by 3%. Meanwhile the shares of border 
state exports were rising to Mexico, EU15, Australia/Oceania, and Africa. The non-
border states exports had the opposite experience with exports to the world growing at 
15% and exports to Canada growing by 35%. The share of non-border state exports to 
both Mexico and Canada rose significantly – though the Mexico share rose twice as fast 
as the Canadian one. In short, while border states were becoming less like the non-border 
states, it was not because of increased intensity of trade with Canada. It was partly 
because border states were increasing share in other parts of the world while non-border 
states were doing relatively better in Canada.  In a few cases, the increased relative share 
of border states exports was to Mexico. One might consider that as evidence of 
regionalization. But it is not in the sense defined in this article. Border states are further 
from Mexico than the non-border states. This suggests that something other than distance 
was at play in determining these changes.
13 In effect, this industry information supported 
the idea that global shocks were impacting key industries and they were having similar 
effects on border state exports to various regions of the world.  
 
Second, the details of the Similarity Index declines were revealed by the I-SIM values for 
the contribution of each industry. The main contributors were industries 27 (Mineral 
Fuel/Oil), 84 (Machinery), 85 (Electrical Machinery), 87 (Vehicles) and 88 
(Aircraft/Spacecraft). Consider heir contributions. Analyzing 20 possible cases of 
                                                 
13 My colleague, Chuck Tryczinka, explains that the distance within the United States may not be 
significant and that the border and non-border states are “equally” close to Canada and Mexico. This 
suggests more inquiry into how to define the smallest unit of significant distance.    18
industry share changes (for these five industries and four export destinations) between 
1996 and 2001 finds only two strong indications of growing regionalization: industries 84 
and 87 exports to Canada. The remaining cases did not support growing dissimilarity in 
the sense that border state industry exports to Canada rose relative to non-border state 
exports. In most cases there was evidence that suggested that differential export 
performance that had nothing to do with distance.  
    
In conclusion, my analysis of Similarity Indexes questions the impact of distance or 
proximity on trade between the US and Canada between 1996 and 2001. During this time 
period, the relationship between the border states and Canada did become more special – 
industry export shares of the closer border states diverged from those of the more distant 
non-border states. While this special distinctiveness of the closer border states might 
indicate a special role for proximity, a closer inspection suggests that the special 
relationship is not what would be normally expected from regional integration. The share 
of border state exports to Canada declined over this time period. Furthermore, it appears 
that existing (in 1996) industry strengths or linkages had more to do with trade than 
proximity. The distinctiveness of the border states arose primarily because the border 
states were increasing trade with non-Canadian destinations while the more distant non-
border states were focusing more on Canada. 
 
Generalizing this result from the Canada/US experience to the full North American Triad 
or other Triads is not warranted. Nevertheless, this paper suggests that digging deeper 
into industry mix and specific sub-triad country or region details is worth the effort.   19
Further work along these lines could expand our understanding of the regional-global 
experiences of trade. We might corroborate Alan Rugman’s conclusion that few 
multinationals are global in the sense that they do not operate in all three triads. But we 
might also find that Rugman simply has not given the process long enough to unfold. If 
apparent regionalization comes more from industry mix and less from proximity, then the 
potential for rapid globalization may be stronger than Rugman admits.    20
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Table 1.  Export Sales of Border States to the World, Canada, and Mexico, 1996  
(in billions of dollars) 
  Mexico   Canada   World 
US 56.761  132.584  622.827 
Border States   7.552  66.371  188.001 
     
New York   0.867  9.655  34.23 
Michigan   3.085  16.613  27.553 
Washington   0.234  2.612  26.482 
Illinois   1.182  7.621  24.176 
Ohio   0.709  10.93  22.676 
Massachusetts   0.326  3.532  14.524 
Indiana   0.325  5.442  10.984 
Wisconsin    0.361 3.128 9.504 
Minnesota   0.23  2.588  8.992 
Vermont    0.022 2.361 3.302 
Idaho    0.044 0.274 1.571 
New Hampshire   0.053  0.52  1.481 
Maine   0.017  0.527  1.38 
North Dakota   0.058  0.38  0.707 
Montana    0.04 0.187 0.44 
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Table 2. Export Sales of Border and Non-Border States to the World, Canada, and 
Mexico, Percentage Change from 1996 to 2001 (in percent) 
  Mexico Canada  World
US 79 23 17
Non-border States  75 35 15
Border States   106 13 23
 
New Hampshire   55 14 62
Idaho   43 29 35
Washington   268 5 32
Maine   96 60 31
Indiana   444 14 31
Illinois   91 50 26
New York   114 1 23
Massachusetts   75 -19 20
Ohio   197 27 19
Michigan   55 6 17
Minnesota   89 2 17
North Dakota   -34 4 14
Montana   -15 62 11
Wisconsin   86 21 10
Vermont   -17 -41 -14
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Table 3. Export Sales Share of Border and Non-Border State Exports to World 
Destinations, 1996 and change from 1996 to 2001 (in percent, shares do not add to 100 
because of rounding errors)  
 
Destination Border  States
96 share + 
or – Change  
Non-Border States 
96 share + 
or – Change 
Canada   35 -3  15 +3 
EU15  21 + 2  20 +1 
Other Asia  13 --  16 -2 
Japan   10 -3  11 -3 
Southeast Asia   5 --  8 -2 
Mexico   4 +3  11 +6 
Other Western       
Hemisphere 
4 --  10 -- 
Rest of Europe  4 --  3 -- 
Africa   1 +1  2 -- 
Australia/Oceania 
                                   
2 +2  2 -- 
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Table 4. Similarity Index Values by Export Destination in 1996 and Percentage 
Change from 1996 to 2001 (index values and percent) 
                                      Index Value   Percent Change 
EU15   79.2   5.4
Canada   79.1   -4.6
World   77.9 -2.3
Other W. Hemis  77.6 -2.6
Other Asia  76.5 -12.2
Australia   74.4 -0.6
Japan   73.3 6.1
Africa   70.1 -26.2
Southeast Asia  69.9 -13.2
Mexico   66.5 -2.6
Other Europe  61.9 -4.3
  
 
  
  
 
 
 